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Abstract
We consider a retailer who buys energy in the wholesale market and resells it to final
consumers. The retailer has to decide when to intervene to change the price he asks
to his customers, in order to maximize his income. We model the problem as an
infinite-horizon stochastic impulse control problem. We characterize an optimal price
strategy and provide analytical existence results for the equations involved. We then
investigate the dependence on the intervention cost. In particular, we prove that the
measure of the continuation region is asymptotic to the fourth root of the cost. Finally,
we provide some numerical results and consider a suitable extension of the model.
MSC Classification: 93E20, 91B70, 91B24.
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1 Introduction
In energy markets, retailers first buy energy in the wholesale market and then resell it
to final consumers. When deciding his price strategy, a retailer has to consider several
elements. Indeed, high prices correspond to high unitary incomes from a small number of
customers, whereas low prices lead to low unitary incomes from a greater market share.
Moreover, the operational costs can overcome the income from the sale of energy. Finally,
adjusting the price implies a cost, so that the intervention times have to be carefully eval-
uated. In this paper, we propose an original model, based on discrete-time interventions
on a continuous-time stochastic process, and determine when and how a representative
retailer should intervene in order to maximize his earnings.
As energy is traded almost instantaneously, the wholesale price of energy can be mod-
elled as a continuous-time stochastic process. Conversely, it is reasonable to represent the
final price of energy by a piecewise-constant process, since all the customers have to be
informed before each price adjustment, due to specific clauses in the contracts. Hence,
the retailer can adjust the price only by means of discrete-time interventions (impulse
controls). More in detail, let Xt be the spread between the final price and the wholesale
price of the commodity, i.e., the net income when selling one unit of energy. The retailer’s
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market share is modelled by Φ(Xt), for a suitable function Φ ∈ [0, 1]. The retailer’s payoff
consists in the income from the sale of energy and in the operational costs, here assumed
to be quadratic with respect to the market share Φ(Xt). Finally, we assume a constant
intervention penalty, namely, c > 0. Hence, if u = {(τk, δk)}k≥1 denotes the retailer’s
intervention policy, i.e., the intervention times and the corresponding shifts in the price
process, we deal with the following impulse control problem:
V (x) = sup
u∈Ux
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XtΦ(Xt)− bΦ(Xt)2
)
dt−
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkc
]
, (1.1)
where Ux is the class of admissible controls and Xt is a scaled Brownian motion with jumps
δk at times τk. We refer to Section 2 for precise definitions and remarks on the model.
To study the problem in (1.1), we use a verification approach: if a function is regular
enough and satisfies a suitable quasi-variational inequality, it coincides with the value
function of the problem and can be used to characterize an optimal control. The procedure
we follow consists in three steps. First, we make an educated guess V˜ for the value
function V , by heuristically solving the quasi-variational inequality. The candidate V˜
depends on five parameters, solution to a suitable system of algebraic equations (smooth-fit
conditions). In the second step of the procedure, we analytically prove that the parameter
system admits a unique solution, so that V˜ is well-defined. The final step consists in
proving that all the assumptions of the verification theorem are satisfied. We then get
a characterization of an optimal control: the retailer should intervene when the state
variable exits from the region ]
¯
x, x¯[ (continuation region), moving the process to a suitable
optimal state x∗, where x∗ is explicitly known and the thresholds
¯
x, x¯ are defined by a
system of algebraic equations.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate the properties of the optimal control
and of the value function with respect to the intervention cost c > 0. When c decreases,
intervening is less expensive, so that the continuation region ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[ (we here specify
the dependence on c) gets smaller, finally degenerating into the singleton {x∗} as c→ 0+.
Moreover, the problem is not robust in a right neighbourhood of zero, in the sense that
dV/dc diverges as c→ 0+, with V as in (1.1). As for the continuation region ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[,
we can actually go farther, proving an asymptotic estimate for this convergence. Namely,
the continuation region converges to its limit as the fourth root of the intervention cost:
¯
x(c) ∼c→0+ x∗ − C 4
√
c, x¯(c) ∼c→0+ x∗ + C 4
√
c, (1.2)
where C > 0. In particular, we provide an explicit expression for C, in terms of the
parameters of the problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of
explicit asymptotic estimates for the continuation region of an impulse control problem.
Finally, we generalize our model by adding a drift term in the underlying process and a
state-dependent term in the intervention cost. We correspondingly adapt the verification
procedure and provide sufficient conditions to characterize an optimal control. In this
extended framework, analytical results are not possible for the system of equations, and
we propose numerical solutions for two set of parameters.
In the past, the price set by a company for a product or service was relatively static in
time. In the last decades, the advent of new technologies allowed quicker price adjustments
and a better understanding of the customers’ demand, leading to a dynamic pricing system.
Correspondingly, a vast literature has arisen on the strategies to select the price strategy
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which maximizes the revenues (yield management problems). We cite the seminal papers
Belobaba [7], McGill and van Ryzin [25], and refer the reader to the comprehensive survey
in Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [16]. Pricing problems for contracts in the energy industry
are considered in Aı¨d [1, Section 4.4], with a detailed literature review on the subject.
Quite surprisingly, existing papers mainly focus on big industrial customers, and the case
of a retailer selling energy to smaller final consumers has not been intensively studied: to
our knowledge, this is the first contribution to the subject.
A key-point in our approach is the use of impulse controls. In impulse control theory,
controllers intervene by discrete-time shifts, moving the process from the current state to
a more convenient one. Conversely, in standard control theory, the underlying process
is affected by continuous-time interventions. In many applications, impulse controls pro-
vide more realistic models with respect to classic controls, since it is often the case that
controllers can intervene on the process only a discrete number of times. Considering, for
example, the case of optimal harvesting problems, optimal dividend policies, or the pricing
problem described in this article, continuous-time controls would not fit the actual nature
of the problems, whereas impulse controls are much closer to the real situation. Besides
the vast range of known applications, impulse control theory is also theoretically chal-
lenging, as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation characterizing standard control theory
is here substituted by a more demanding quasi-variational inequality. For these reasons,
impulse control theory has become a rich research subject in the latest years, both from
a theoretical point of view and in terms of practical applications.
For a general introduction to impulse problems, we refer the reader to Øksendal and
Sulem [29, Chap. 6]. For a viscosity approach to the quasi-variational inequality charac-
terizing the value function of impulse problems, see Davis et al. [15], Guo and Wu [19].
Øksendal [28], Øksendal et al. [30] study the robustness of a class of impulse problems
with respect to the intervention costs. The extension of impulse control theory to the case
where several players are present, i.e., impulse game theory, has been studied by Cosso
[14] in the zero-sum case and recently by Aı¨d et al. [2], Basei et al. [6], Ferrari and Koch
[18] in the nonzero-sum case. Federico et al. [17] propose an alternative approach to deal
with stationary one-dimensional impulse control problems. Impulse controls have been
used to model optimization problems for exchange and interest rates, see Cadenillas and
Zapatero [13], Jeanblanc-Picque´ [21], Mitchell et al. [26], Mundaca and Øksendal [27]. For
dividend policy optimization, we refer to Alvarez and Lempa [5], Cadenillas et al. [10],
Cadenillas et al. [12], Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev [22]. As for inventory problems, we
cite Bensoussan et al. [8], Cadenillas et al. [11], Harrison et al. [20]. Impulse controls also
model problems in optimal harvesting: we refer the reader to Alvarez [4], Willassen [31].
Finally, for portfolio optimization see, e.g., Korn [23], Korn [24].
The contribution of this paper is twofold: financial and mathematical. On the one
hand, from a financial point of view, we propose a tractable model for the optimization
problem faced by a retailer setting the price policy to sell his customers the energy he
bought in the wholesale market. In so doing, we aim at filling a gap in the literature, as
detailed above. Key-points in our approach are the use of impulse controls and the presence
of analytical existence results with semi-explicit formulas. In particular, we would like to
underline the potentialities of impulse controls applied to problems in energy markets:
although technically more demanding than standard controls, they better incorporate
some features of the markets. On the other hand, from a mathematical point of view, our
main contribution consists in (1.2). To our knowledge, explicit asymptotic estimates for
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the continuation region of an impulse control problem have never been investigated and
proved before. In particular, in Remark 5.3 we extend (1.2) to any impulse problem with
constant intervention costs, Brownian underlying, quadratic symmetric payoff, i.e., to any
problem in the form
sup
u∈Ux
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(Xt − xv)2dt−
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkc
]
, (1.3)
with Xt as above and for suitable constants σ, c > 0, xv ∈ R. This provides a better
insight on the properties of impulse problems and leaves room for further research, as
problems in the form (1.3) are common in impulse control theory, see Øksendal and Sulem
[29, Chap. 7] and the references therein.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a precise formulation
of the problem and its mathematical framework. Section 3 provides a verification theorem,
i.e., sufficient conditions to characterize the value function and an optimal control. By
means of such conditions, in Section 4 we make an educated guess for the value function,
prove that it is well-defined (the definition involves a system of algebraic equations), apply
the verification theorem to characterize an optimal control. Section 5 collects several
estimates with respect to the intervention cost c > 0 and, in particular, an asymptotic
estimate for the continuation region as c→ 0+. Extensions of the model are proposed in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Formulation of the problem
We consider a retailer who buys energy (e.g., electricity, gas, gasoline) in the wholesale
market and resells it to final consumers. We model the wholesale price of the commodity
(i.e., what the retailer pays for one unit of energy) by a scaled Brownian motion:
St = s+ σWt, (2.1)
for t ≥ 0, where s > 0 is the initial wholesale price, σ > 0 is a fixed constant and W is a real
Brownian motion defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), where {Ft}t≥0
is the natural filtration of W . For the Brownian motion as a model for the electricity
price, see Benth and Koekebakker [9] and Remark 2.3 below. Also, we refer to Section 6
for a generalization of (2.1) including a drift term. Notice that the retailer has no control
on the wholesale price: in most of the cases, i.e., when the company is not too big, this is
a reasonable assumption.
The retailer resells the energy he bought to final consumers. According to the most
common contracts in energy markets, a retailer can change the price only after a written
communication to his customers. Hence, we model the final price of the commodity (i.e.,
what consumers actually find in their bill for one unit of energy) by a piecewise-constant
process P . Namely, we consider an initial price p > 0, a sequence {τk}k≥1 of increasing
random times, corresponding to the retailer’s interventions to adjust the price, and a
sequence {δk}k≥1 of real-valued impulses, corresponding to the jumps of the process (the
retailer can both increase and decrease the price). For every t ≥ 0, we then have
Pt = p+
∑
τk≤t
δk. (2.2)
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In Definition 2.1 below, we provide precise conditions on the variables τk and δk. We also
assume that the retailer faces a fixed cost c > 0 when intervening to adjusts the price
Pt. We refer to Section 6 for a generalization including a state-dependent term in the
intervention costs.
Let us denote by Xt the difference between the final price Pt and the wholesale price
St, at time t ≥ 0. In other words, Xt represents the retailer’s unitary net income from the
sale of energy. By (2.1) and (2.2), we have
Xt = Pt − St = x− σWt +
∑
τk≤t
δk, (2.3)
for each t ≥ 0, where we have set x = p− s.
It is reasonable to assume that the retailer’s market share at time t ≥ 0 is a function
of the spread Xt, denoted by Φ(Xt). Here, Φ is a suitable function with values in [0, 1],
where Φ(Xt) = 0 means that the retailer has no customers and Φ(Xt) = 1 corresponds to
a monopolistic position. We underline the importance of linking the market share to the
spread Xt, rather than to the final price Pt. Indeed, assuming that the market share only
depends on Pt would be misleading: if the wholesale price St is high, all the retailers in
the market would ask a high final price, so that high values of Pt very close to St would
still be advantageous from the consumers’ point of view.
We now model the function Φ. First, we notice that, if the spread Xt increases, the
retailer has a bigger margin on the sale of energy, which may result in the loss of some
customers; hence, the function Φ has to be decreasing. Moreover, if Xt is close to zero,
that is, if the retailer sells energy at the lowest price possible for him, the market share
will be close to 1; hence, we expect Φ(0) = 1. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that, if
the spread is too big, say Xt ≥ ∆, the retailer loses all his customers; hence, we assume
Φ(∆) = 0, where ∆ > 0 is a fixed constant. A simple function with this properties (also
see Remark 2.3) is given by
Φ(x) =

1, x ≤ 0,
− 1∆(x−∆), 0 < x < ∆,
0, x ≥ ∆,
(2.4)
for every x ∈ R. In other words, the market share is here a truncated linear function of
Xt, with two thresholds: if Xt ≤ 0 all the customers buy energy from the retailer, whereas
if Xt ≥ ∆ the retailer has lost all his customers.
Managing customers implies some continuous-time operating costs faced by the retailer
(customer service, technical structures,...). Such costs are clearly increasing with respect
to the market share Φ(Xt): the more customers the retailer has, the bigger the operating
costs are. Indeed, as the number of customers increases, more and more investments are
needed (a bigger structure to manage customer service,...), not proportional to the increase
in the market share. For this reason, we consider increasing returns to scale, and assume
that the operating costs are quadratic with respect to the market share, i.e., given by
bΦ(Xt)
2, where b ≥ 0 is a fixed constant. In particular, we underline that the case b = 0
is possible and consistent with the model.
The retailer’s cash flow at time t ≥ 0 consists in the income from the sale of energy
XtΦ(Xt) (unitary income multiplied by the market share) and in the operating costs
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bΦ(Xt)
2. Hence, the instantaneous payoff in t ≥ 0 is given by R(Xt), with
R(x) = xΦ(x)− bΦ(x)2 =

x− b, if x < 0,
f(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ ∆,
0, if x > ∆,
(2.5)
where x ∈ R is the current state of the process and f is a concave parabola,
f(x) = −α(x− xv)2 + yv, α = ∆ + b
∆2
, xv =
∆(∆ + 2b)
2(∆ + b)
, yv =
∆2
4(∆ + b)
. (2.6)
From an economical point of view, we remark the following properties of the payoff R.
- The payoff is bounded from above, with maxx∈RR(x) = R(xv) = yv. Hence, the
optimal static state is xv. Notice that the corresponding market share is
Φv = Φ(xv) =
∆
2(∆ + b)
. (2.7)
In particular, if b = 0 the optimal share is 1/2.
- The payoff is positive, R(Xt) ≥ 0, if and only if Xt ∈ [xz,∆], where
xz =
2b∆
2(∆ + b)
. (2.8)
In other words, if we want the income from the sale of energy to be higher than the
operational costs, we need the spread between the wholesale price and the final price
to be greater than xz.
- If we consider xv, yv, xz,Φv as functions of b, we notice that
x′v(b) > 0, y
′
v(b) < 0, x
′
z(b) > 0, Φ
′
v(b) < 0, (2.9)
for each b ≥ 0. Some intuitive properties of the model are formalized in (2.9):
as the operational costs increases, the optimal spread xv increases, the maximal
instantaneous income yv decreases, the region where the payoff is positive gets smaller
and the optimal share decreases. In particular, we remark that Φv ∈ ]0, 1/2[: for
any value of b, it is never optimal to have a market share greater than 1/2.
To sum up, we here consider the following impulsive stochastic control problem, on an
infinite-horizon and with discount rate ρ > 0.
Definition 2.1 (Admissible controls). Let x ∈ R be the initial state of the process and
denote by Ex the expectation under the condition X0 = x.
- A control is a sequence u = {(τk, δk)}k∈N, where {τk}k∈N are stopping times such
that 0 ≤ τk ≤ τk+1 ≤ +∞ (the intervention times) and {δk}k∈N are real-valued
Fτk-measurable random variables (the corresponding impulses).
- A control u = {(τk, δk)}k∈N is admissible if limt→+∞ τk = +∞ and
Ex
[∑
k∈N
e−ρτk
]
<∞. (2.10)
We denote by Ux the set of admissible controls.
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Definition 2.2 (Value function). The value function V is defined, for each x ∈ R, by
V (x) = sup
u∈Ux
J(x;u), (2.11)
where, for every u = {(τk, δk)}k∈N ∈ Ux, we have set
J(x;u) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xx;ut )dt−
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkc
]
, (2.12)
with Xx;u as in (2.3) and R as in (2.5). We say that u∗ ∈ Ux is an optimal control if
V (x) = J(x;u∗).
We remark that the functional J in (2.12) is well-defined by (2.10). Moreover, in order
to simplify the notation, we will often omit the dependence on the control and the initial
state, writing X = Xx;u.
Remark 2.3. A key-point in our model is the use of impulse controls: as underlined in the
Introduction, the discrete-time nature of impulse controls better fits the practical problem
we are here considering, if compared to standard continuous-time controls. On the other
hand, impulse controls are technically more demanding, and getting tractable solutions
sometimes requires some initial simplifications in the coefficients of the problem. Our
goals are to propose an original model, provide tractable formulas with analytical existence
results, show the potentialities of impulse controls for the applications in energy markets
problems. Incorporating more structured elements in the model (e.g., mean-reverting St,
exponential Φ) is the object of an ongoing research.
3 Verification theorem
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions to characterize the value function and the
optimal control for the problem in Section 2.
We briefly recall the heuristics behind the operator and the equation involved in the
verification theorem below (Proposition 3.2), referring the reader to [29, Ch. 6] for a
comprehensive introduction to stochastic impulse control theory. Given an initial state
x ∈ R and the function V in (2.11), V (x) represents the value of the problem, i.e., the
maximal expected gain the retailer can achieve. Denote now by MV (x) the value of
the problem under the additional condition that the retailer immediately intervenes and
behaves optimally afterwards (formal definition in (3.1)). Heuristically, we haveMV (x) ≤
V (x) for any state x ∈ R, with equality in the case where it is optimally to intervene. We
then get a characterization of an optimal control: the retailer should intervene when the
state is a zero of MV − V , shifting the process to the maximum point of V . In order to
find an expression for V , we notice that, in the region where it is optimal to intervene,
V is implicitly defined by the equation MV = V . Instead, in the region where it is not
optimal to intervene, the controlled process is actually a standard uncontrolled diffusion,
so that the value function satisfies a suitable second-order ordinary differential equation,
by a simple application of the Itoˆ formula. Combining the conditions in the two regions,
we get the quasi-variational inequality in (3.2). Definition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 make
this arguments rigorous.
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Definition 3.1. Let V be a function from R to R with supV ∈ R. The function MV is
defined, for every x ∈ R, by
MV (x) = sup
δ∈R
{V (x+ δ)− c} = supV − c. (3.1)
Proposition 3.2 (Verification Theorem). Let the notations of Section 2 hold and let
V be a function from R to R satisfying the following conditions.
- V is bounded and there exists x∗ ∈ R such that V (x∗) = maxx∈R V (x);
- D = {MV − V < 0} is a finite union of intervals;
- V ∈ C2b (R \ ∂D) ∩ C1b (R);
- V is a solution to the quasi-variational inequality
max
{σ2
2
V ′′ − ρV +R, MV − V
}
= 0. (3.2)
Let x ∈ R and let u∗ = {(τ∗k , δ∗k)}k∈N be recursively defined, for k ≥ 1, by (we omit the
dependence on x, i.e., u∗ = u∗(x), τ∗k = τ
∗
k (x), δ
∗
k = δ
∗
k(x))
τ∗k = inf
{
t > τ∗k−1 : (MV − V )
(
X
x;u∗k−1
t
)
= 0
}
,
δ∗k = x
∗ −Xx;u
∗
k−1
τ∗k
,
where we have set τ∗0 = δ∗0 = 0 and u∗k = {(τ∗j , δ∗j )}0≤j≤k. Then, provided that u∗ ∈ Ux,
u∗ is an optimal control and V (x) = J(x;u∗).
Proof. We here recall the main arguments and refer to [29, Thm. 6.2] for the details. By
an approximation argument, we can assume V ∈ C2b (R). By the Itoˆ formula for jump
processes and the dominated convergence theorem, for each x ∈ R and u ∈ Ux we have
V (x) = Ex
[
−
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(σ2
2
V ′′(Xx;ut )− ρV (Xx;ut )
)
dt+
∑
k∈N
e−ρτk
(
V (Xx;uτk )− V (Xx;u(τk)−)
)]
.
By (3.1) and (3.2), we then get
V (x) ≥ Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xx;ut )dt+
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkc
]
= J(x;u).
In the case u = u∗, the same arguments lead to V (x) = J(x;u∗), concluding the proof.
Remark 3.3. Practically, the optimal control consists in intervening when the state exits
from the region {MV − V < 0}, shifting the process to the optimal state x∗ = arg maxV .
Notice that the real line is divided into two complementary region: {MV −V = 0}, where
the retailer intervenes (action region), and {MV − V < 0}, where the retailer does not
intervene (continuation region).
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4 Optimal price strategy
In this section, we characterize the value function and an optimal price strategy for the
problem in Section 2, by means of the verification theorem in Section 3.
Our procedure is as follows. In Section 4.1 we make an educated guess for the value
function, solving (3.2) and imposing the regularity conditions. The candidate we get
involves five parameters, implicitly defined by a system of algebraic equations. In Section
4.2 we prove that a solution to this system actually exists, so that the candidate we built
is well-defined. Finally, in Section 4.3 we check that all the assumptions of Proposition
3.2 are satisfied and characterize an optimal price policy for the retailer.
4.1 A candidate for the value function
We here make an educated guess V˜ for the value function V . The quasi-variational in-
equality (3.2) suggests the following representation for V˜ :
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕ(x), if x ∈ {MV˜ − V˜ < 0},
MV˜ (x), if x ∈ {MV˜ − V˜ = 0},
where ϕ is a solution to the equation
σ2
2
ϕ′′ − ρϕ+R = 0, (4.1)
with R as in (2.5) and MV˜ as in (3.1). We now need to solve the equation in (4.1) and
to guess an expression for {MV˜ − V˜ < 0} (continuation region), {MV˜ − V˜ = 0} (action
region) and MV˜ .
The retailer needs to intervene if the process X gets too high (this implies a low number
of customers, and a corresponding low income) or too small (high market share, but low
unitary income). Hence, we guess that the continuation region is in the form ]
¯
x, x¯[, for
suitable values
¯
x < x¯. Moreover, we assume ]
¯
x, x¯[ to be included in ]0,∆[. The real line
is then divided into:
{MV˜ − V˜ < 0} = ]
¯
x, x¯[ ⊆ ]0,∆[, where the retailer does not intervene,
{MV˜ − V˜ = 0} = R\]
¯
x, x¯[, where the retailer intervenes.
We now investigate the expression of MV˜ . Heuristically, it is reasonable to assume that
the candidate value function V˜ has a unique maximum point x∗, which belongs to the
continuation region ]
¯
x, x¯[, where V˜ = ϕ:
max
y∈R
{V˜ (y)}= max
y∈]
¯
x,x¯[
{ϕ(y)}=ϕ(x∗), with ϕ′(x∗)=0, ϕ′′(x∗)≤0,
¯
x<x∗<x¯,
so that by (3.1) we have
MV˜ (x) = ϕ(x∗)− c.
Finally, recall that R = f in ]
¯
x, x¯[, with f as in (2.6). Then, a solution to (4.1) is
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
θx +A2e
−θx − k2(x− xv)2 + k0, (4.2)
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for x ∈ R and constants A1, A2 ∈ R, where we have set (xv, yv, α as in (2.6))
θ =
√
2ρ
σ2
, k2 =
α
ρ
, k0 =
yv
ρ
− 2k2
θ2
. (4.3)
The candidate V˜ depends on five parameters: A1, A2,
¯
x, x¯, x∗. Such parameters have to be
chosen so as to satisfy the regularity assumptions of the verification theorem. Namely, we
need V˜ ∈ C2(R\{
¯
x, x¯})∩C1(R), so that we have to impose continuity and differentiability
in
¯
x and x¯, leading to four equations on the five parameters of the candidate (a fifth
equation comes from the optimality of x∗).
Summarizing the previous arguments, we get the following expression for the candidate
value function V˜ .
Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ R, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕA1,A2 is as in (4.2) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy
0 <
¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆ (4.4)
and the following conditions:
ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) = 0 and ϕ′′A1,A2(x
∗) < 0, (optimality of x∗)
ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x) = 0, (C1-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕ′A1,A2(x¯) = 0, (C
1-pasting in x¯)
ϕA1,A2(¯
x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c, (C0-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c. (C0-pasting in x¯)
(4.5)
4.2 Existence and uniqueness of a solution to the coefficient system
We now prove that Definition 4.1 is well-posed, i.e., that there exists a unique solution
to (4.4)-(4.5). Actually, uniqueness immediately follows from the uniqueness of the value
function (different solutions would imply different expressions for the value functions), so
that we can just focus on the existence of solutions.
Since the underlying process is a Brownian motion and the running cost f in (2.6) is
symmetric with respect to xv, we expect the function ϕA1,A2 to be symmetric with respect
to xv, which corresponds to the choice A1e
θxv = A2e
−θxv . The same argument suggests to
set (
¯
x+ x¯)/2 = xv. Finally, as a symmetry point is always a local maximum or minimum
point, we expect x∗ = xv. In short, our guess is
A1 = Ae
−θxv , A2 = Aeθxv , (
¯
x+ x¯)/2 = xv, x
∗ = xv, (4.6)
with A ∈ R. In particular, the function ϕA1,A2 in (4.2) now writes
ϕA(x) = Ae
θ(x−xv) +Ae−θ(x−xv) − k2(x− xv)2 + k0, (4.7)
where A ∈ R and the coefficients have been defined in (4.3).
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An easy check shows that x∗ = xv is a local maximum for ϕA, so that the first condition
in (4.5) is satisfied, if and only if A > 0. Moreover, two of the four equations left are now
redundant. Then, under our guess (4.6), we can equivalently rewrite (4.5) as{
ϕ′A(x¯) = 0,
ϕA(x¯) = ϕA(xv)− c,
with A > 0. As for the order condition (4.4), under (4.6) it reads 0 < x¯ − xv < ∆ − xv
(recall that xv ∈ [∆/2,∆[). To simplify the notations, let
y¯ = x¯− xv.
Then, V˜ is well-defined if there exists a solution (A, y¯) to the system
Aθeθy¯ −Aθe−θy¯ − 2k2y¯ = 0, (4.8a)
Aeθy¯ +Ae−θy¯ − k2y¯2 − 2A+ c = 0, (4.8b)
A > 0, y¯ > 0, (4.8c)
under the additional condition
y¯ < ∆− xv. (4.9)
In Lemma 4.2 we focus on (4.8), whereas in Lemma 4.3 we prove that the solution to
(4.8) also satisfies (4.9).
Lemma 4.2. There exists a unique solution (A, y¯) to (4.8).
Proof. We first consider Equation (4.8a). If we fix A > 0, we are looking for the strictly
positive zeros of the function hA defined by
hA(y) = Aθe
θy −Aθe−θy − 2k2y, (4.10)
for each y > 0. Since
h′A(y) = Aθ
2eθy +Aθ2e−θy − 2k2 = Aθ
2(eθy)2 − 2k2(eθy) +Aθ2
eθy
,
we separately consider the cases A ≥ A¯ and 0 < A < A¯, where
A¯ =
k2
θ2
=
σ2(∆ + b)
2ρ2∆2
. (4.11)
If A ≥ A¯, we have h′A > 0 in ]0,∞[. Hence, since hA(0) = 0, Equation (4.8a) does not
have any solution in ]0,+∞[. On the contrary, if 0 < A < A¯, we have h′A < 0 in ]0, y˜[
and h′A > 0 in ]y˜,∞[, for a suitable y˜ > 0. Hence, since hA(0) = 0 and hA(+∞) = +∞,
Equation (4.8a) has exactly one solution y¯ > y˜ > 0. We have proved that, for a fixed
A > 0, Equation (4.8a) admits a solution y¯ ∈]0,∞[ if and only if A ∈]0, A¯[; in this case,
the solution is unique and we denote it by y¯ = y¯(A). Finally, we remark that
lim
A→0+
y¯(A) = +∞, lim
A→A¯−
y¯(A) = 0. (4.12)
We now consider Equation (4.8b). For each A ∈]0, A¯[, we set
g(A) = −Aeθy¯(A) −Ae−θy¯(A) + k2y¯2(A) + 2A, (4.13)
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where y¯(A) is well-defined by the first step. We are going to prove that
lim
A→0+
g(A) = +∞, lim
A→A¯−
g(A) = 0, g′ < 0. (4.14)
This concludes the proof: if (4.14) holds, then Equation (4.8b), that is, g(A) = c, has
exactly one solution A ∈]0, A¯[, so that the pair (A, y¯(A)) is the unique solution to (4.8).
By (4.8a) we can rewrite g(A) as
g(A) = k2y¯
2(A)− 2k2
θ
(eθy¯(A) − 1)2
(eθy¯(A))2 − 1 y¯(A), (4.15)
and we get the first claim in (4.14) by (4.12). The second claim in (4.14) is immediate by
(4.13) and by (4.12). Finally, differentiating the expression in (4.13) and recalling (4.8a),
we have
g′(A) = −(e
θy¯(A) − 1)2
eθy¯(A)
− (Aθeθy¯ −Aθe−θy¯ − 2k2y¯)y¯′(A) = −(eθy¯(A) − 1)2
eθy¯(A)
< 0, (4.16)
proving the third claim in (4.14).
Lemma 4.3. Let xv be as in (2.6) and let
c¯ = ξ(∆− xv),
where the function ξ is defined, for y > 0, by
ξ(y) = k2y
2 − 2k2
θ
(eθy − 1)2
(eθy)2 − 1y = k2y
2 − 2k2
θ
eθy + e−θy − 2
eθy − e−θy y. (4.17)
Then, the solution (A, y¯) to (4.8) satisfies the order condition in (4.9) if and only if c < c¯.
Proof. Let (A, y¯) = (A, y¯(A)) be as in the proof of Lemma 4.2. By (4.15) and the identity
g(A) = c, we have that ξ(y¯) = c, with ξ as in (4.17). Now notice that
ξ′(y) =
2k2
θ
eθy + e−θy − 2
(eθy − e−θy)2 C(y), (4.18)
where we have set
C(y) = θy(eθy + e−θy)− (eθy − e−θy).
Notice that we have C(y) > 0 for each y > 0, since C(0+) = 0 and C ′(y) > 0. Hence,
the function ξ is strictly increasing. As a consequence, the inequality in (4.9) holds, i.e.,
y¯ < ∆ − xv, if and only if ξ(y¯) < ξ(∆ − xv), that is, if and only if c < c¯, where we have
used the relation ξ(y¯) = c and the definition of c¯.
The next proposition summarizes the results proved in this section.
Proposition 4.4. Assume c < c¯, with c¯ as in Lemma 4.3. Then, the function V˜ in
Definition 4.1 is well-defined, as there exists a unique solution
(A1, A2,
¯
x, x¯, x∗)
to the system in (4.4)-(4.5), given by
A1 = Ae
−θxv , A2 = Aeθxv ,
x∗ = xv,
¯
x = xv − y¯, x¯ = xv + y¯,
with xv as in (2.6), θ as in (4.3) and (A, y¯) the unique solution to (4.8)-(4.9).
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Remark 4.5. Notice that the constant c¯ in Lemma 4.3 and Proposition 4.4 is given by
c¯ = ξ(∆− xv) = ξ(∆2/(2∆ + 2b)),
where the function ξ is defined in (4.17) and with xv as in (2.6). In particular, the threshold
c¯ is increasing with respect to ∆ and decreasing with respect to b.
Remark 4.6. From the proofs of this section, we notice that the function V˜ can also be
represented as
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA(x), in ]
¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA(x
∗)− c, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
(4.19)
where ϕA is defined in (4.7), x
∗ = xv with xv as in (2.6),
¯
x+ x¯ = 2xv, (A, x¯) the unique
solution to {
ϕ′A(x¯) = 0,
ϕA(x¯) = ϕA(xv)− c.
(4.20)
More in detail, A ∈ ]0, A¯[ is the unique solution to g(A) = c, with g as in (4.13) and A¯ as
in (4.11), and x¯ = xv + y¯, where y¯ is the unique solution to ξ(y¯) = c, with ξ as in (4.17).
4.3 Application of the verification theorem
We now check that the candidate in Section 4.1, well-defined by Section 4.2, actually
satisfies all the assumptions of the verification theorem. Even if x∗ is explicit in our
candidate, x∗ = xv, we prefer to keep the notation x∗ in the proofs of this section, in order
to underline the optimality of this state.
Lemma 4.7. Assume c < c¯, with c¯ as in Lemma 4.3, and let V˜ be as in Definition 4.1.
Then, for every x ∈ R we have
MV˜ (x) = ϕA(x∗)− c, (4.21)
with A as in Proposition 4.4 and ϕA as in (4.7). In particular, we have
{MV˜ − V˜ < 0} = ]
¯
x, x¯[, {MV˜ − V˜ = 0} = R \ ]
¯
x, x¯[. (4.22)
Proof. We use the representation in Remark 4.6. Notice that:
- V˜ is strictly decreasing in ]x∗, x¯[ (since we have V˜ = ϕA by definition and ϕ′A < 0
in ]x∗, x¯[ by the proof of Lemma 4.2);
- V˜ is constant in [x¯,+∞[ by definition of V˜ , with V˜ ≡ ϕA(x∗)− c.
Since V˜ is symmetric with respect to x∗, we deduce that
max
y∈R
V˜ (y) = V˜ (x∗) = ϕA(x∗), min
y∈R
V˜ (y) = ϕA(x
∗)− c, (4.23)
so that (4.21) holds by Definition 3.1. Moreover, by (4.19) it follows that
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = 0, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[.
Finally, as ϕA(x¯) = ϕA(x
∗) − c by (4.20) and ϕA(x¯) = min[
¯
x,x¯] ϕA by the previous argu-
ments, we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = ϕA(x∗)− c− ϕA(x) = ϕA(x¯)− ϕA(x) < 0, in ]
¯
x, x¯[,
which concludes the proof.
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Proposition 4.8. Assume c < c¯, with c¯ as in Lemma 4.3, and let V˜ be as in Definition
4.1. For every x ∈ R, an optimal control for the problem in Section 2 is given by u∗ =
{(τ∗k , δ∗k)}k∈N, where the variables (τ∗k , δ∗k) are recursively defined, for k ≥ 1, by
τ∗k = inf
{
t > τ∗k−1 : X
x;u∗k−1
t /∈ ]¯x, x¯[
}
,
δ∗k = x
∗ −Xx;u
∗
k−1
τ∗k
,
(4.24)
where we have set τ∗0 = δ∗0 = 0 and u∗k = {(τ∗j , δ∗j )}0≤j≤k. Moreover, V˜ coincides with the
value function: for every x ∈ R we have
V˜ (x) = V (x) = J(x;u∗).
Remark 4.9. Practically, an optimal price policy for the retailer consists in intervening
when X exits from ]
¯
x, x¯[. When this happens, the retailer shifts the process to the state
x∗ = xv. The parameters
¯
x, x¯ are defined by an algebraic system of equations, for which
existence and uniqueness results have been provided in Section 4.2.
Proof. We have to check that the candidate V˜ satisfies all the assumptions of Proposition
3.2. For the reader’s convenience, we briefly report the conditions to check:
(i) V˜ is bounded and maxx∈R V˜ (x) exists;
(ii) V˜ ∈ C2b (R \ {¯x, x¯}) ∩ C
1
b (R);
(iii) V˜ satisfies max{AV˜ − ρV˜ +R,MV˜ − V˜ } = 0;
(iv) the optimal control is admissible, i.e., u∗ ∈ Ux for every x ∈ R.
Condition (i) and (ii). The first condition holds by (4.23), whereas the second condi-
tion follows by the definition of V˜ .
Condition (iii). We have to prove that for every x ∈ R we have
max{AV˜ (x)− ρV˜ (x) +R(x),MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x)} = 0. (4.25)
We use the representation in Remark 4.6. In ]
¯
x, x¯[ the claim is true, as MV˜ − V˜ < 0 by
(4.22) and
σ2
2
V˜ ′′ − ρV˜ +R = σ
2
2
ϕ′′A − ρϕA + f = 0,
by the definition of ϕA. As for R\]
¯
x, x¯[, we already know by (4.22) that MV˜ − V˜ = 0.
Then, to conclude we have to prove that
σ2
2
V˜ ′′(x)− ρV˜ (x) +R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ R\]
¯
x, x¯[.
By symmetry, it is enough to prove the claim for x ∈ [x¯,+∞[. By the definition of V˜ (x)
and (4.20), in the interval [x¯,+∞[ we have V˜ ≡ ϕA(x∗)− c = ϕA(x¯); hence, the inequality
reads
−ρϕA(x¯) +R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯,+∞[.
As R is decreasing in [x∗,+∞[ ⊇ [x¯,+∞[, it is enough to prove the claim in x = x¯:
−ρϕA(x¯) +R(x¯) ≤ 0.
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Since (σ2/2)ϕ′′A(x¯)− ρϕA(x¯) + f(x¯) = 0 and f(x¯) = R(x¯), we can rewrite as
−σ
2
2
ϕ′′A(x¯) ≤ 0,
which is true as x¯ is a local minimum of ϕA ∈ C∞(R).
Condition (iv). Given x ∈ R, by Definition 2.1 we have to show that
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
k
]
<∞.
When acting according to the optimal control u∗, the retailer intervenes when the process
hits
¯
x or x¯ and shifts the process to x∗ ∈ ]
¯
x, x¯[. As a consequence, we can decompose each
variable τ∗k as a sum of suitable exit times from ]¯
x, x¯[. Given y ∈ R, let ζy denote the exit
time of the process y + σW , where W is a real Brownian motion, from the interval ]
¯
x, x¯[;
then, we have τ∗1 = ζx and
τ∗k = ζ
x +
k−1∑
l=1
ζx
∗
l ,
for every k ≥ 2, where the variables ζx∗l are independent and distributed as ζx
∗
. As a
consequence, we have
Ex
[∑
k≥2
e−ρτ
∗
k
]
= Ex
[∑
k≥2
e−ρ
(
ζx+
∑k−1
l=1 ζ
x∗
l
)]
= Ex
[
e−ρζ
x
∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
.
By the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of the variables:
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x
∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
= Ex
[
e−ρζ
x]∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
.
As the variables ζx
∗
l are identically distributed with ζ
x∗
l ∼ ζx
∗
, we can conclude:∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
=
∑
k≥2
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗]k−1
<∞,
which is a converging geometric series.
Numerical simulations. We conclude this section with some numerical simulations,
obtained with Wolfram Mathematica. We consider the following two sets of parameters
and plot the value functions in the interval [0,∆].
Problem 1: ρ = 0.03, σ = 0.2, b = 0.0, c = 2.0, ∆ = 5.0,
Problem 2: ρ = 0.05, σ = 0.3, b = 3.0, c = 0.5, ∆ = 5.0.
We also plot, as a dashed line, the function ϕA. We notice the C
1-pasting in
¯
x, x¯ and the
maximum point in x∗ = xv. Also, as remarked in Section 2, the coefficients b moves the
maximum point towards the boundary ∆. Finally, the parameter c has clearly an impact
on the size of the interval ]
¯
x, x¯[: we investigate this property in the next section.
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Figure 1: x 7→ V (x) for Problem 1.
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Figure 2: x 7→ V (x) for Problem 2.
5 Estimates with respect to the intervention cost
In this section, we investigate the impact of the parameter c > 0 (intervention cost) on
the value function V and on the continuation region ]
¯
x, x¯[. The main result of this section
is an asymptotic estimate for ]
¯
x, x¯[ as c→ 0+, see Proposition 5.1.
We briefly recall from Section 4.2 the symmetric representation for the value function
(we here write V = V c,
¯
x =
¯
x(c), x¯ = x¯(c), A = A(c), in order to stress the dependence
on c):
V c(x) =
{
ϕA(c)(x), x ∈ ]¯x(c), x¯(c)[,
ϕA(c)(xv)− c, x ∈ R\]¯x(c), x¯(c)[,
(5.1)
where the function ϕA(c) is defined in (4.7) and ¯
x(c), x¯(c) are defined by
¯
x(c) = xv − y¯(c), x¯(c) = xv + y¯(c), (5.2)
with A(c) ∈ ]0, A¯[ and y¯(c) > 0 implicitly defined by the equations
g(A(c)) = c, ξ(y¯(c)) = c, (5.3)
with g as in (4.13) and ξ as in (4.17). Recall that we have ξ′ > 0 and g′ < 0, so that A(c)
and y¯(c) are well-defined, we refer to Section 4.2 for the details.
Asymptotic estimates as c → 0+. If the intervention costs vanish, i.e., c → 0+,
intervening gets costless, so that we expect the retailer to continuously intervene to keep
the process in the optimal state. Hence, X
x;u∗(c)
t gets constant and equal to x
∗ = xv, the
value function V c converges to
∫∞
0 e
−ρtR(xv)dt = yv/ρ with yv as in (2.6), the continuation
region ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[ collapses into the singleton {xv}. Notice that the limit optimal control
is formally not admissible, as it would require continuous-time interventions.
Actually, thanks to the results in the previous section, we can prove a stronger result.
Namely, we investigate the asymptotic behaviour of ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[ as c → 0+, proving that
¯
x(c), x¯(c) converge to xv like the fourth root of c. To our knowledge, this is the first time
that an asymptotic estimate for the continuation region of an impulse control problem is
provided.
Proposition 5.1. The following asymptotic estimates hold:
¯
x(c) ∼c→0+ xv − C 4
√
c, x¯(c) ∼c→0+ xv + C 4
√
c, (5.4)
where we have set C = 4
√
6σ2/α, with α as in (2.6). In particular, we have
lim
c→0+ ¯
x(c) = lim
c→0+
x¯(c) = xv. (5.5)
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Proof. By (5.2) we have to estimate y¯(c) as c→ 0+. Since y¯(c) is defined by ξ(y¯(c)) = c,
see (5.3), we start by estimating the function ξ. Recall by (4.17) that
ξ(y) =
θk2y
2(eθy − e−θy)− 2k2y(eθy + e−θy − 2
)
θ(eθy − e−θy) ,
for every y > 0. By the Taylor series we have
eθy − e−θy = 2θy + 1
3
θ3y3 + o
(
y4
)
,
eθy + e−θy = 2 + θ2y2 +
1
12
θ4y4 + o
(
y5
)
,
leading to the following approximation:
ξ(y) ∼y→0+
θk2y
2
(
2θy + θ3y3/3
)− 2k2y(θ2y2 + θ4y4/12)
2θ2y
=
k2θ
2
12
y4. (5.6)
Since ξ(0+) = 0 by (4.17) and ξ is a one-to-one map by (4.18), from the relation in (5.3)
we deduce that
y¯(0+) = 0. (5.7)
It then follows from (5.6) that
ξ(y¯(c)) ∼c→0+
k2θ
2
12
y¯4(c).
The relation ξ(y¯(c)) = c, see (5.3), then implies
y¯(c) ∼c→0+ 4
√
12
k2θ2
4
√
c, (5.8)
which concludes the proof, since k2θ
2 = 2α/σ2.
Remark 5.2. The coefficient C is increasing w.r.t. σ and decreasing w.r.t. α, which is
reasonable: if the volatility σ increases, the continuation region gets bigger to reduce the
frequency of the interventions, whereas, if the concavity α of the payoff increases, the
continuation region gets smaller to keep the process close to the optimal value. Finally,
we notice that the asymptotic estimate in (5.4) is independent of the discount factor ρ.
Remark 5.3. We remark that (5.4) holds for a more general class of problems, namely,
for any control problem with symmetric quadratic payoff, constant intervention costs and
Brownian underlying. More in detail, for any problem in the form
V (x) = sup
u∈Ux
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(Xx;ut − xv)2dt−
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkc
]
, Xx;ut = x+ σWt +
∑
τk≤t
δk,
the continuation region is in the form ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[ and converges to the singleton {xv} as
c→ 0+, with estimate
¯
x(c), x¯(c) ∼c→0+ xv ± C˜ 4
√
c, C˜ =
4
√
6σ2.
To our knowledge, there are no references in the literature for similar estimates.
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Proposition 5.4. The following pointwise limits hold:
lim
c→0+
V c(x) = V static, lim
c→0+
X
x;u∗(c)
t = xv, (5.9)
for every x ∈ R and t ≥ 0, where we have set V static = yv/ρ, with yv as in (2.6).
Proof. Since
¯
x(c) and x¯(c) converge to xv, for any x ∈ R \ {xv} we have that x ∈
R\]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[ for c small enough (say, c ≤ c˜(x)). Hence, by (5.1) we have
V c(x) = ϕA(c)(xv)− c, c ∈ ]0, c˜(x)[, x ∈ R \ {xv}. (5.10)
Instead, in the case x = xv, since xv ∈]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[, by (5.1) we have
V c(xv) = ϕA(c)(xv), c ∈ ]0,+∞[. (5.11)
By (5.10) and (5.11) it follows that for every x ∈ R we have
lim
c→0+
V c(x) = lim
c→0+
ϕA(c)(xv) = ϕA(0+)(xv).
Let A¯ be as in (4.11). Since g(A¯−) = 0 by (4.13) and since g is a one-to-one map by
(4.14), the identity in (5.3) implies that
A(0+) = A¯.
Then, by the definition of ϕA¯ in (4.7), the definition of A¯ in (4.11) and the value of k0 in
(4.3), we have
lim
c→0+
V c(x) = ϕA¯(xv) = 2A¯+ k0 =
yv
ρ
,
which proves the first claim in (5.9). Finally, since
¯
x(c) < Xx;u
∗(x,c) < x¯(c)
by the definition of u∗(c), the second claim in (5.9) immediately follows by passing to the
limit as c→ 0+.
Monotonicity. We now investigate the monotonicity of the continuation region and
the value function with respect to c. When the intervention cost decreases, the retailer
intervenes more frequently, so that we expect a smaller continuation region and a bigger
value for the problem.
Proposition 5.5. For every c > 0 and x ∈ R we have
¯
x′(c) < 0, x¯′(c) > 0,
d
dc
V c(x) < 0. (5.12)
In particular, the value function is always smaller than the static maximum:
V c(x) < V static, (5.13)
where V static is the constant defined in Proposition 5.4.
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Proof. By (5.2) and (5.3), we have
x¯′(c) = y¯′(c) =
1
ξ′(y¯(c))
> 0,
where we recall that ξ′ > 0 by (4.18). By symmetry, it then follows that
¯
x′(c) < 0. As for
the value function, by (5.1) and the definition of ϕA(c) in (4.7) we have
dV c
dc
(x) =
{
A′(c)
(
eθ(x−xv) + e−θ(x−xv)
)
, x ∈ ]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[,
2A′(c)− 1, x ∈ R\]
¯
x(c), x¯(c)[,
(5.14)
which concludes the proof since by (5.3) we have
A′(c) =
1
g′(A(c))
< 0, (5.15)
where we recall that g′ < 0 by (4.14).
Robustness. Finally, we study how sensitive the value function is with respect to small
changes in c around zero. First in [28] and then in [30], it has been shown that intervention
costs in the form c + λ˜|δ|, with λ˜ > 0, imply that dV c/dc diverges as c → 0+, which is
extremely problematic when performing numerical experiments. Our problem does not
belong to the class studied in [30], as we here have λ˜ = 0. However, this property is present
in our case as well. Thanks to the estimate in the previous sections, we can actually prove
a stronger result, providing an asymptotic estimate for the derivative as c→ 0+.
Proposition 5.6. For every x ∈ R, we have
dV c
dc
(x) ∼c→0+ −Cˆ
1√
c
,
where Cˆ = σ/(
√
6ρ). In particular, we have
lim
c→0+
dV c
dc
(x) = −∞.
Proof. By (5.15) and (4.16) we have
A′(c) =
1
g′(A(c))
= − e
θy¯(c)
(eθy¯(c) − 1)2 ,
for any c > 0. By the Taylor series and (5.8), we then have
A′(c) ∼c→0+ −
1
θ2y¯2(c)
∼c→0+ −
1
θ2C2
√
c
,
with C as in Proposition 5.1. In particular, A′(0+) = −∞, so that by (5.14) we have
(consider separately x ∈ R \ {xv} and x = xv, recalling that
¯
x(c), x¯(c) converge to xv)
dV c
dc
(x) ∼c→0+ 2A′(c) ∼c→0+ −
2
θ2C2
√
c
.
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Numerical simulations. We conclude with some numerical simulations showing the
results above. Figure 3 considers the data of Problem 1 (see Section 4.3) and plots the
function x 7→ V c(x) for the values (from top to bottom) c = 0+, 1, 5, 10, 15. We here
have c¯ = 16.9, so all such values are admissible. We notice that V 0
+ ≡ V static, that the
interval ]
¯
x, x¯[ increases as c increases and that the value V c(x) decreases as c increases, for
any x ∈ R. Figure 4 also refers to Problem 1 and plots the boundaries of the continuation
region as a function of c, i.e., c 7→
¯
x(c), x¯(c). We also plot, as dashed lines, the optimal
state x∗ = xv and the asymptotic estimates c 7→ xv ± C 4
√
c, with C as in Proposition 5.1.
We notice the monotonicity properties and the limit as c → 0+, when the continuation
region degenerates into the singleton {xv}.
0 1 2 3 4 5
20
25
30
35
40
45
Figure 3: x 7→ V c(x) for Problem 1 and in-
creasing values of c.
2 4 6 8 10
1
2
3
4
Figure 4: c 7→ x(c), x¯(c) for Problem 1.
6 Extensions of the model
In this section, we extend the model in Section 2 and provide suitable adaptations of the
previous results. We consider the following extensions.
- We add a drift term to the wholesale price: St = s+µt+σWt, for a constant µ ∈ R.
As a consequence, given u = {(τk, δk)}k∈N, the controlled process is now
Xx;ut = Pt − St = x− µt− σWt +
∑
τk≤t
δk. (6.1)
- In Section 2, the intervention cost was a fixed constant c. We now add a state-
dependent term, proportional to the market share Φ(Xx;ut ). Namely, we assume
that the cost is given by K(Xx;ut ), with X
x;u
t as in (6.1) and where
K(x) = c+ λΦ(x) =

λ+ c, if x < 0,
− λ∆(x−∆) + c, if 0 ≤ x ≤ ∆,
c, if x > ∆,
(6.2)
where x ∈ R is the state of the process before the intervention and c > 0, λ ≥ 0 are
fixed constants. For λ = 0, we retrieve the constant costs of Section 2. Correspond-
ingly, the functional J in (2.12) now reads (with R as in (2.5))
J(x;u) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xx;ut )dt−
∑
k∈N
e−ρτkK
(
Xx;u
(τk)−
)]
. (6.3)
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- The cost function in (6.2) is not smooth, and we cannot apply the verification the-
orem. However, if the controlled process X never exits from the interval ]0,∆[, the
singularities of the penalty function no longer belong to the set where the value
function is defined, and the verification theorem can be applied. Then, we require a
further condition to admissible controls u ∈ Ux, besides the one in Definition 2.1:
Ex
[∑
k∈N
e−ρτkK
(
Xx;u
(τk)−
)]
<∞, Xx;ut ∈ ]0,∆[, ∀t ≥ 0. (6.4)
Practically, (6.4) forces the retailer to intervene (at least) every time his market
share hits 0 or 1; in other words, we do not admit situations where the retailer has
no customers or where he holds the monopoly of the market, making this assumption
mild and reasonable from a practical point of view.
The verification theorem in Proposition 3.2 still holds in this new framework, with
minor changes. In particular, the quasi-variational inequality (3.2) now writes
max
{σ2
2
V ′′ − µV ′ − ρV +R, MV − V
}
= 0. (6.5)
The solution to (σ2/2)V ′′ − µV ′ − ρV + f = 0 is given by
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
m1x +A2e
m2x − k2x2 + k1x− k˜0, (6.6)
where A1, A2 ∈ R and we have set
m1,2 =
µ±
√
µ2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
,
k2 =
α
ρ
, k1 =
2αxv
ρ
+
2αµ
ρ2
, k˜0 =
αx2v − yv
ρ
+
α(σ2 + 2µxv)
ρ2
+
2αµ2
ρ3
,
(6.7)
with α, xv, yv as in (2.6). Given the equation in (6.5), the same arguments as the ones in
Section 4.1 lead to the following candidate value function.
Definition 6.1. For each x ∈ ]0,∆[, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(x−∆), in ]0,∆[\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕA1,A2 is as in (6.6) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy
0 <
¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆ (6.8)
and the following conditions:
ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) = 0 and ϕ′′A1,A2(x
∗) < 0, (optimality of x∗)
ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x) = λ/∆, (C1-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕ′A1,A2(x¯) = λ/∆, (C
1-pasting in x¯)
ϕA1,A2(¯
x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(
¯
x−∆), (C0-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(x¯−∆). (C0-pasting in x¯)
(6.9)
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The new structure of the problem does not allow an easy adaptation of the techniques
in Section 4.2 and we need to rely on numerical simulations to verify the existence of
a solution to (6.8)-(6.9). Provided that such a solution exists, the verification theorem
applies and we get the following characterization of an optimal control.
Proposition 6.2. Assume that a solution to (6.8)-(6.9) exists. Moreover, assume that
there exist x˜1, x˜2, with
¯
x < x˜1 < x
∗ < x˜2 < x¯, such that ϕ′′A1,A2 < 0 in ]x˜1, x˜2[ and ϕ
′′
A1,A2
>
0 in ]
¯
x, x˜1[∪ ]x˜2, x¯[. Finally, assume
¯
x < xˆ < x¯, where we have set xˆ = xv − (ρλ)/(2α∆).
Then, for every x ∈]0,∆[ an optimal control u∗ for the problem described in this section
exists and is given by (4.24). Moreover, the value function of the problem is given by V˜
in Definition 6.1.
Proof. Easy adaptation of the proofs in Section 4.3.
Remark 6.3. The practical interpretation in Section 4.3 still holds: the retailer should
intervene when the state variable exits from the region ]
¯
x, x¯[, shifting the process to the
optimal state x∗. The difference is that the system characterizing
¯
x, x¯, x∗ is no longer
analytically tractable.
Numerical simulations. We here consider the following sets of parameters and plot
the corresponding value functions.
Problem 3: ρ = 0.03, µ = 0.2, σ = 0.25, b = 0.4, c = 1.5, λ = 0.0, ∆ = 5.0,
Problem 4: ρ = 0.05, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.3, b = 0.5, c = 1.0, λ = 0.5, ∆ = 5.0.
We also plot, as a dashed line, the function ϕA1,A2 : notice the C
1-pasting in
¯
x, x¯. As
expected, the value functions are no longer symmetric: the right part of the bell-shaped
curve is steeper that the left one, due to the drift in the underlying process.
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Figure 5: x 7→ V (x) for Problem 3.
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Figure 6: x 7→ V (x) for Problem 4.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we look for an optimal price policy for a retailer selling energy to final
consumers. The retailer buys the energy in the wholesale market and can adjust the final
price he asks only by discrete-time interventions. His market share depends on the spread
between the final price and the wholesale price, and each intervention corresponds to a
fixed cost c > 0. We model the problem as an infinite-horizon impulse control problem.
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By a verification procedure, we characterize the value function and an optimal price
policy: the retailer needs to intervene when the state variable exits from a fixed interval
]
¯
x, x¯[, moving the process to the most convenient state x∗. The value of x∗ is explicit,
whereas
¯
x, x¯ are characterized by a system of algebraic equations. We provide analytical
results for the existence and uniqueness of solutions to this system.
We then focus on the role of the intervention cost c > 0 in the optimal control. In
particular, we provide an asymptotic estimate for the convergence of the continuation
region ]
¯
x, x¯[ as c → 0+. Namely, the interval ]
¯
x, x¯[ converges to the singleton {xv}, and
its length converges to zero as the fourth root of the cost c.
Finally, we propose some extensions to the problem, incorporating a drift term and
variable intervention costs. Numerical results exemplify the properties we have proved.
To the best of our knowledge, the approach we present is original, and asymptotic
estimates for impulse control problems have never been provided before. In particular, we
would like to underline the scope and potentialities of impulse controls for optimization
problems in energy markets.
Several directions are possible to further develop the results here presented. For exam-
ple, more structured models for the wholesale price can be considered (e.g., mean-reverting
model for St), as well as different models for the market share function. In these cases,
careful analyses are needed to study the properties of the optimal controls, as analytical
existence results and semi-explicit formulas would no longer be possible. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to consider the extension of the techniques in Alvarez [3] and Alvarez
and Lempa [5] to the case of two-sided impulse control problems, i.e., problems where the
continuation region is a bounded interval.
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